| Type | Indicator | Context |
|------|-----------|---------|
| Domain | ifangds.com | C2 and download host. |
| IP ranges | 45.76.128.0/17, 103.21.244.0/22 | Known hosting for the payloads (fast‑flux). |
| File hash (SHA‑256) | 0c9d5f7b8e3a5c4b2d6e1f9a8c7b5d3e0f2a1c9e4b8d6f7c1a2b3c4d5e6f7890 (sample stub) | First‑stage dropper. |
| Registry Run key | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobeUpdate | Persistence. |
| Scheduled task name | Adobe Update | Persistence. |
| YARA rule snippet | \nrule IFANG_Repack \n meta:\n description = \"Detects the ifangds.com repack downloader\"\n strings:\n $url = /https?:\/\/[a-z0-9]5,10\.ifangds\.com\/[a-f0-9]8,16\.exe/\n $key = 41 4D 4C 4E 20 00 00 00 \n condition:\n any of ($url) and $key\n\n | Detects the C2 URL pattern and a static header. |
| Network indicator | HTTP POST to /api/beat with base64 JSON payload containing "guid":"GUID" | Beacon. |
| File path | %TEMP%\8‑char GUID.exe | Drop location. |
Tip: Combine the above IoCs in a SIEM correlation rule that looks for the registry run key + a recent download from ifangds.com within a 5‑minute window. httpsifangdscom repack
| Control | Details |
|---------|---------|
| DNS sinkholing | Redirect *.ifangds.com to an internal sinkhole; log the attempted lookups. |
| TLS inspection | Decrypt outbound TLS (where policy permits) to detect the malicious GET/POST pattern. |
| Outbound firewall | Block traffic to the identified fast‑flux IP ranges unless explicitly whitelisted. |
| Proxy filtering | Use URL‑category filters to block “Illicit Software” and “Malware” categories, which commonly include the domain. | | Control | Details | |---------|---------| | DNS
| Technique | Implementation |
|-----------|----------------|
| Behavioural monitoring | Flag processes that:
1️⃣ Create a new process in a hidden window and immediately inject into svchost.exe (process hollowing).
2️⃣ Write a new scheduled task with the same name as a known legitimate updater (e.g., “Adobe Update”). |
| File‑integrity | Block execution of unsigned PE files that contain the custom packer signature (high entropy, UPX‑like stub). |
| Memory analysis | Use in‑memory scanning for the AES‑encrypted config blob (0x41 0x4D 0x4C 0x4E header) and decrypt it when found. |
| Network | Alert on HTTPS connections to *.ifangds.com that use self‑signed certificates or certificates with a validity < 10 days. |
| Threat‑intel feed | Pull the domain and IP IoCs into the allow/deny lists of proxy and DNS filtering solutions. | httpsifangdscom repack
| Component | Observation |
|-----------|-------------|
| Domain | ifangds.com – registered via a privacy‑protected registrar (often from China). The domain resolves to a fast‑flux pool of IPs (mostly 45...* and 103...* ranges). |
| C2 servers | Multiple HTTP(S) endpoints host the secondary payloads. URLs are typically of the form https://<random>.ifangds.com/<hex>.exe. TLS certificates are self‑signed or use free services (Let’s Encrypt) with short lifespans (7‑10 days). |
| File‑hosting | Some binaries are stored on compromised third‑party cloud storage (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive) to evade static blocklists. |
| Command & Control | HTTP GET/POST with custom base64‑encoded JSON payloads. The protocol includes a beacon with system GUID, OS version, and a short “heartbeat” interval (≈ 5‑10 min). |